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Constructivism is an approach to social scien­
ce1 that has penetrated the discipline of in­
ternational politics in distinct forms, usually 
occupying the so­called midfield between 
positivist and post­positivist or reflectivist2 ap­
proaches (Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998, 347­8; 
Wendt, 1999, 40; Christiansen et al., 1999). 
While positivist approaches have been overly 
concerned with ‘explaining’ international 
phenomena, in terms of providing causal Hu­
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1 The idea that constructivism is not a theory but an approach, is shared by various authors who have written about 
the main tenets of constructivism, like Emanuel Adler (1997); Ted Hopf (1998, 196); John G. Ruggie (1998, 856, 
879­80); Richard Price and Christian Reus­Smit (1998, 259); and Alexander Wendt (1999, 7). Jeffrey T. Checkel 
suggested that, more than anything else, constructivism remained a method (1998, 325­6, 342). Martha Finnemore 
considered constructivism as a ‘sociological approach’, a social theory and not a theory of politics (Finnemore, 1996, 
4, 27). This view is shared by Adler, who considered constructivism as “a social theory on which constructivist theories 
of international politics – for example, about war, cooperation and international community – are based” (1997, 323). 
Maja Zehfuss, a thorough critic of constructivism, also opts to label constructivism as an approach, after noting that 
there is a discussion about “[…] whether constructivism is properly to be seen as a theory of ir or rather as a philo­
sophical category, a meta­theory or a method for empirical research, or whether it is indeed an approach relevant at 
several levels” (Zeffuss, 2002, 8­9).
2 The term ‘reflectivist’ was introduced by R.O. Keohane “to refer to those ir scholars who reject the scientific 
explanation to social science of the mainstream rationalists” (Kurki, 2008, 3).
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mean­like explanations, reflectivist approaches 
have been mostly concerned with ‘understan­
ding’ how the meanings of social­international 
relationships are constructed, broadly using 
interpretive methods to assess the role of dis­
cursive practices (Hollis and Smith, 1990; Kur­
ki, 2008, 4­5). Constructivism, or so­called 
‘social constructivism’, has been engaged by 
many scholars interested in combining both 
‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’, in a form to 
provide both causal and constitutive theori­
sations for social­international phenomena, 
and thus filling the space between positivist 
and reflectivist approaches, sometimes as a 
way of putting them together, or just bringing 
them ‘closer’. As it usually happens with these 
kinds of attempts, combinations are always 
more laden to one side or the other, and so 
constructivism has been broadly criticised both 
by positivist and poststructuralist scholars. 
Yet, constructivism’s middle­range flag keeps 
on waving, and continues to be a theoretical 
alternative to those researchers that do not 
feel comfortable with positivism, but that also 
remain dubious of the fully­fledged discursive 
analyses engaged by poststructuralists.
Applications of constructivist theori­
sing to the study of regionalism are varied as 
are the possibilities to combine causal and 
constitutive theorising. More often than not, 
constructivists do not differentiate between 
relationships of constitution and causation in 
their analyses, and usually grant implicit causal 
power to constitutive factors. When claiming 
relationships of mutual constitution and cau­
sation between structure and agency, construc­
tivism usually falls into under­explanation or 
under­specification, as it gives the impression 
that everything – all the considered factors or 
variables – is mutually constituted and caused, 
as if ‘everything explained everything’: where 
ideational structures are claimed to cause and 
constitute each other and agency, it becomes 
rather difficult to answer questions about the 
causes (why?) and the ways (how?) agency 
occurs.
The present paper aims to problematise 
constructivism’s middle­ground aim by asses­
sing the ways in which constructivist analyses 
to regionalism address the relationships of 
constitution and causation between collec­
tive identity and regional institutions. The 
reviewed works emphasise the role of identity 
and institutions in the unfolding of regiona­
list projects in different parts of the world. In 
my view, the reasons to focus particularly on 
these two ideational structures are two­fold. 
First, one main ontological tenet of construc­
tivism is that identity is at the basis of actors’ 
interests (Checkel, 1998; Ruggie, 1998; Price 
and Reus­Smit, 1998; Wendt, 1999). Second, 
if regionalism is considered a state­led project 
aimed at organising a specific region along 
certain political and economic lines (Gamble 
and Payne, 1996, 2), it is clear that the pursuit 
of regionalism necessarily entails a minimum 
level of institution building; for the implemen­
tation of specific political and economic lines 
requires a minimum institutional framework 
that allows organising policy areas in the region 
and the unfolding of regionalism.
This review will show that constructivism 
offers diverse ways of conceptualising the 
relationships of constitution and causation 
between identity and institutions, and thus, 
explanations can be of a wide range of types. 
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As a consequence, it will be argued that by 
acknowledging relationships of mutual cons­
titution and causation between identity and 
institutions, constructivism faces limitations 
in ‘explaining’ the ways in which regionalism 
unfolds, in terms of providing explanations of 
the causal role of identity and institutions in 
orienting state agency. Drawing upon Kurki’s 
work (2008) on the concept of causation in 
International Relations, I argue that these 
limitations are due to a narrow conception of 
the concept of cause that is almost exclusively 
attached to the Humean conception of cau­
sation. If constitutive theorising is different 
from casual theorising, then the constitutive 
and causal role of ideational institutions must 
be differentiated, and this is precisely whe­
re constructivism faces trouble. In turn, by 
broadening the concept of cause and specifying 
distinct types of causes, constructivist accounts 
may be more able to provide explanations for 
the causes of social action (‘why?’ questions) 
and the ways they unfold (‘how?’ questions). 
Further, the paper argues that in order to carry 
on the analysis, constructivism needs to ‘brac­
ket’ each ideational structure and to bracket 
agency, so social structures can be assessed as 
having both constitutive and ‘transformative 
causal’ effects. This is something that cons­
tructivist analyses of regionalism do not often 
explicitly do. The paper suggests that ‘bracke­
ting’ is the strategy by which different types of 
causes can be identified, thus enabling cons­
tructivism to combine constitutive and causal 
theorising (‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’), 
and further, to provide better explanations 
of the role of identity and institutions in the 
unfolding of regionalism.
The paper is divided in three sections. 
Section 1 provides a brief review of the main 
ontological and epistemological tenets of cons­
tructivism, emphasising the aim of combining 
constitutive and casual theorising, which in­
trinsically implies a distinction between the 
two. Section 2 reviews some constructivist 
analyses of regionalism that consider identity 
as preceding regional institution building, and 
thus identity is seen to hold a constitutive but 
not necessarily causal role. Section 3 reviews 
other constructivist analyses of regionalism 
where interaction and socialisation processes 
that occur within existing institutional fra­
meworks lead to the rise and reinforcement 
of a collective identity, and special emphasis 
is made on a case where collective identity is 
claimed to have been created by norms, in a 
group of states that did not share a previous 
collective regional identity before engaging 
the regionalist project. Finally, Section 4 will 
show that by assessing relationships of mutual 
constitution and causation between identity 
and institutions, constructivism does not give 
a clear sense about why and how regionalism 
unfolds in the ways it does, as identity, insti­
tutions and agency seem to be indistinctively 
mutually constituted and caused. As a result, 
it will be argued that constructivism needs to 
broaden the conception of causation and open 
the room for distinguishing diverse types of 
causes, as well as using the strategy of ‘bracke­
ting’ social structures and agency in order to 
provide better explanations for the unfolding 
of regionalism.
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1. ConstruCtivism’s Combination of 
Constitutive and Causal theorising
Some authors have suggested common ontolo­
gical grounds for constructivism, while at the 
same time recognising that the most significant 
differences between different versions of cons­
tructivism are found in the field of epistemolo­
gy3. On the ontological arena, constructivism’s 
main point of departure is to emphasise the 
importance of ideas, as they constitute the 
meanings that actors grant to material resou­
rces. Accordingly, Price and Reus­Smit assert 
that constructivism underscores the impor­
tance of normative and ideational structures 
as well as material structures, for systems of 
meaning define how actors interpret their 
material environment, and “institutionalised 
meaning systems are thought to define the so­
cial identities of actors” (Price and Reus­Smit, 
1998, 266, partly building on Adler, 1997). 
Quoting Wendt (1995, 73), they point out 
that “material resources only acquire meaning 
for human action through the structure of sha­
red knowledge in which they are embedded” 
(Price and Reus­Smit, 1998: 266). Checkel 
agrees with these ontological claims, as he tells 
us that “the environment in which agents/sta­
tes take action is social as well as material” and 
that “this setting can provide agents/states with 
understandings of their interests (it can ‘cons­
titute’ them)” (Checkel, 1998, 325­6). On his 
part, Ruggie considers that one core feature of 
constructivism is to conceive systems of rules as 
the main social structures within which social 
interaction takes place. Accordingly, actors are 
subject to structural constraints that are in part 
material, in part institutional (Ruggie, 1998, 
879). In a later work, Wendt tells us that “the 
structures of human association are determi­
ned primarily by shared ideas rather than ma­
terial forces” (Wendt, 1999, 1). In these terms, 
constructivism opposes rationalist­materialist 
approaches which explain behaviour according 
to actors’ interests exogenously given, oriented 
at the maximisation of benefits and the increa­
sing of power conceived as the accumulation of 
material resources. Constructivism holds that 
the meaning of material factors is constituted 
by ideational structures like identity, insti­
tutions, norms, knowledge and culture that 
inform agents on the ways to think about the 
relevance of material factors. These ideational 
structures are conceived as social structures 
of knowledge that constitute actors’ interests 
which, in contrast to rationalist­materialist 
approaches, are conceived as ideas (Finnemore, 
1996, 146).
Another common ontological tenet of 
constructivism is the emphasis on the role of 
identity as a key factor in the constitution of 
actors’ interests. Price and Reus­Smit assert 
that identities constitute interests and actions: 
“To explain preference formation, construc­
tivists focus on actors’ social identities. As 
Wendt (1992, 398) contends, ‘Identities are 
3 See Adler (1997, 333­4); Hopf (1998, 182); Checkel (1998, 327); Ruggie (1998, 879­80) and Risse (2009). For 
Price and Reus­Smit, differences among different types of constructivism are mainly ‘analytical’ (Price and Reus­Smit, 
1998, 267­8). 
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the basis of interests’” (Price and Reus Smit, 
1998, 267). Ruggie asserts that another core 
feature of constructivism is to consider that 
identities and interests are socially constructed 
through interaction (Ruggie, 1998, 879). And 
Wendt points put that another basic tenet of 
constructivism is that that “the identities and 
interests of purposive actors are constructed by 
[…] shared ideas rather than given by nature” 
(Wendt, 1999, 1).
Yet, although constructivism emphasises 
the constitutive role of ideas, there is a variant 
of constructivist scholars who consider that 
ideational structures have causal power4. This 
type of constructivism could be named ‘soft’, 
in contrast to a more ‘radical’ one5 for which 
describing is the way of ‘explaining’, not being 
interested in providing causal explanations6. 
According to Finnemore, the challenge for 
constructivists is not just to demonstrate that 
ideas matter, but to assess the ways in which 
they matter (Finnemore, 1996, 130) – that is, 
assessing their explanatory role. Accordingly, 
each constructivist identifies “a different socia­
lly constructed variable as causal and describes 
the causal process in a slightly different way, 
but all share a willingness to make social struc­
tures causal as well as a belief that these struc­
tures mould preferences in important ways” 
(Finnemore, 1996, 17). ‘Soft’ constructivists 
thus hold that ideational factors can explain 
agency, in the sense of establishing causes that 
explain why agency occurred the way it did.
Explanations in social science traditiona­
lly consist of identifying the causes that make 
action take place. The positivist tradition has 
usually relied on the Humean conception of 
causation7, by which to say that A explains 
B means that, in the absence of A, B would 
have not occurred. The Humean conception 
of causation affirms that four conditions must 
be satisfied if we are to be sure that A caused 
4 This is the type of constructivism that Price and Reus­Smit (1998), Hopf (1998) and Ruggie (1998) labelled, 
respectively as ‘modern’, ‘conventional’ and ‘neo­classical’/‘naturalistic’, and it is also the one that Checkel (1998) 
focused his review on. In my view, Ruggie’s ‘neoclassical’ type of constructivism, which he claims to follow, can be 
included within the other authors’ ‘modern’ and ‘conventional’ types, for Ruggie himself acknowledges that it does 
have an aim of ‘explaining’ and a commitment to an idea of doing ‘science’. 
5 The term ‘soft’ is taken from Onuf (2012, chapter 2), who opposes a ‘strong’ type of constructivism (namely his) 
to a ‘soft’ one of other authors like Wendt, Finnemore, Checkel, and Katzenstein among others. The term ‘radical’ 
is taken from Onuf ’s (2012, 44) quotation of the work of Drulák, who emphasises the ‘radical change’ that the em­
phasis on language issues implies for constructivist analysis (Drulák 2004, 6­13). Walter and Helmig (2005, 1) also 
refer to ‘radical constructivism’ as the one taking the epistemological stance of focusing on the key role of language in 
constructing social reality. See also Onuf (1989, 78­94; 2012, 29, 43) and Drulák (2004, 4, 2006, 501­3).
6 Price and Reus­Smit (1998) and Ruggie (1998) labelled this other type of constructivism as ‘postmodern’, while 
Hopf (1998) named it ‘critical’. However, these authors included in their reviews a number of postmodern and 
poststructuralist scholars who have rejected their inclusion under the constructivist label (as pointed out by Zehfuss, 
2002, 8).
7 Following Kurki (2008, 6­7) the term ‘Humean’ refers to certain key principles often attributed to Hume’s phi­
losophy of causation, but the ‘Humean’ conception of causation entails an empiricist connotation that David Hume’s 
philosophy does not self­evidently hold.
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B in some occasion, namely: A preceded B; 
there was no intermediate event; events like B 
are always followed by events like A in those 
conditions; and we are in the habit of expec­
ting the sequence (Hollis and Smith, 1990, 
49). Furthermore, Humean causal analysis 
subscribes an empiricist position where causal 
relations are regularity relations of patterns of 
observables, and causes refer exclusively to ‘mo­
ving’ causes’ that ‘push and pull’ (Kurki, 2008, 
6, emphasis original), like mechanisms that 
transform the state of things. In social science 
this reasoning is problematic, for a social event 
– which in constructivist terms includes an 
individual action, can hardly be understood as 
the consequence of one single factor (such as 
‘A’). Multiple factors – and of different types, 
i.e. materialist or ideational – usually orient 
agency. Moreover, factors cannot be ‘isolated’ 
or ‘excluded’ from an event that already occu­
rred. Yet, the Humean conception of causation 
has been most and almost only an alternative 
considered by all theoretical approaches in 
the study of international politics, including 
positivist and post­positivist approaches. This 
consideration has served as the basis for posi­
tivist approaches to make claims about their 
scientific validity and denying it to reflectivist 
approaches, and has warranted the poststruc­
turalist position of rejecting the analysis of 
causes (Kurki, 2008, 7­8).
Even those constructivists who attempt 
to combine causal and constitutive theorising, 
have often based this differentiation on atta­
ching causal theorising to the Humean con­
ception of causation, while associating cons­
titutive theorising with interpretive methods 
(Kurki, 2008, ch. 4). Constructivism claims 
to offer an alternative conception of ‘explana­
tion’, one that combines ‘explaining’ – broadly 
building on the Humean conception of cau­
sation – and ‘understanding’, which is more 
related to the ways in which actors interpret 
the world. According to Hollis and Smith, 
in positivist terms, ‘explaining’ consists of 
establishing relations of causation, answering 
questions of the type ‘why’, and focusing on 
how the structural forces of nature (or ‘social’ 
nature, in a more radical form of positivism) 
push actors to behave one way or another. They 
also tell us that “explanation involves an appeal 
to causal laws and not only to generalizations” 
(Hollis and Smith, 1990, 63). In turn, ‘unders­
tanding’ deals with questions of the type ‘how’, 
and focuses on the actors’ view as the starting 
point for research (p. 2­3). While ‘explaining’ 
envisions the world as an independent envi­
ronment from agents’ thinking and to some 
extent predictable, ‘understanding’ envisions 
the world as a construction consisting of rules 
and meanings (p. 6). Following these authors, 
“To understand is to reproduce the order in the 
minds of actors; to explain is to find causes in 
a scientific manner” (p. 87). In these terms, 
the ‘soft’ version of constructivism stands on 
the middle­ground between ‘explaining’ and 
‘understanding’ as it has a clear aim of finding 
causal explanations for social events, while fo­
cusing on the ways in which ideas that inform 
their interests are socially constructed.
Hollis and Smith argue in their book that 
attempting to combine ‘explaining’ and ‘un­
derstanding’ at the same time is problematic, 
and that combinations of bits of one and bits 
of the other do not solve the problem of ad­
dressing their differing aims (1990, 7). Yet, it 
 pi Rev Oasis 17_final.indb   12 2/5/14   11:01 AM
1 3
o a s i s ,  n o  1 7
E n f o q u E s  r E g i o n a l E s
is in these terms that ‘soft’ constructivism has 
been assessed as constituting a ‘via media’ bet­
ween positivist and post­positivist approaches 
to international politics. Wendt, who has been 
perhaps the constructivist scholar that has 
dealt in greater extent with the philosophical­
scientific grounds of constructivism, develops 
this combination of ‘explaining’ and ‘unders­
tanding’ through distinguishing causal and 
constitutive theorising (Wendt, 1999, 77­89). 
For Wendt, ideas play a constitutive role as 
long as they inform actors’ interests and grant 
meaning to material factors, but they also play 
a causal role inasmuch as they motivate action. 
In these terms, Wendt aligns his arguments to 
the philosophical position that asserts that rea­
sons are causes (Davidson, 1963), contrary to 
the Wittgestein an (interpretive) position that 
rejects that reasons can be causes, since reasons 
are understood as examples of rule­following 
behaviour (Kurki, 2008, 73­4)8.
According to Wendt, constitutive and 
causal theorising are not incompatible because 
they just ask different questions, and therefo­
re both are needed in order to provide more 
encompassing explanations. Causal theorising 
asks questions of the type ‘why’ and ‘how’, 
while constitutive theorising ask questions of 
the type ‘what is’ and ‘how possible’ (Wendt, 
1999, 83­6). In these terms, when the ideas 
that inform agents’ thinking are found as rea­
sons that motivated behaviour, constructivists 
claim that those ideas have causal power. As 
Wendt points out, “Norms are causal insofar 
as they regulate behaviour. Reasons are causes 
to the extent that they provide motivation 
and energy for action” (p.,83). This has taken 
Steve Smith to suggest that the distinction that 
constructivists (though particularly pointing 
to Wendt’s work) make between constitutive 
and causal theorising is rather blurred and con­
fusing, and that constitutive theorising seems 
just a form of causal theorising (Smith, 2000, 
157). Yet, when constructivists find certain 
ideas that configure an agent’s identity, they 
do not claim that such ideas ‘cause’ that iden­
tity. But very often in their analyses, when a 
certain identity is assessed as a motivation for 
actors’ engagement of certain behaviour, such 
identity is implicitly acknowledged as having 
causal power, while it is simultaneously asses­
sed as constituting actors’ interests. Hence, 
constructivism’s combination of causal and 
constitutive theorising often entails a blurred 
distinction between ‘explaining’ and ‘unders­
tanding’.
In her enlightening work about the con­
cept of causation in ir, Milja Kurki (2008) has 
shown that constructivists’ reluctance to grant 
causal powers to ideas is due to their excluding 
association of the concept of causation to the 
Humean conception of conception described 
above. Although some constructivists like 
Wendt and Dessler have developed theoretical 
insights that aim to transcend the Humean 
conception of causation, they have reproduced 
it when attempting to draw a clear line separa­
ting constitutive from causal theorising (Kurki, 
2008, 177­84). Partly drawing on the works of 
Suganami, Wight and Patomäki, Kurki shows 
8 The possibility of conceiving reasons as causes is discussed in the last section of this paper.
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that by engaging the philosophical doctrine of 
‘scientific’ or ‘critical’ realism, it is possible to 
acknowledge the causal powers of empirica­
lly unobservable elements such as ideas (pp. 
161­73). Further, Kurki argues that through 
reclaiming the Aristotelian conceptualisation 
of causes, it is possible to distinguish different 
types of causes that make unnecessary the 
distinction between constitutive and causal 
theorising (ch. 6), offering a way to sort out 
the constructivist crossroads between ‘explai­
ning’ and ‘understanding’. Kurki’s position on 
causation will be further developed in the last 
section of the paper. In the meantime, let us 
move to the observation of different ways in 
which constructivist analyses of regionalism 
conceptualise the relationships of constitution 
and causation between identity and institu­
tions, in order to show that by differentiating 
constitutive and causal theorising, constructi­
vism tends to fall into serious confusion.
2. identity preCeding regional 
institution building
Among the constructivist analyses to regiona­
lism reviewed in this paper, the work of Fredrik 
Söderbaum on regionalism in Southern Africa, 
as well as the one in conjunction with Björn 
Hettne on the concept of ‘regionness’ and the 
work of Luk Van Langenhove on the concept 
of ‘regionhood’, suggests that the process of 
construction of a region entails the configura­
tion of a collective identity that may eventually 
motivate agents to engage a regionalist project 
and build regional institutions. Nonetheless, 
none of these approaches show a systematic 
explanation of the causal effects of identity on 
regional institution building, and instead they 
point out constitutive effects of the former over 
the latter. Moreover, none of these authors 
show explicit concern about differentiating 
relationships of constitution and causation 
between identity and institutions.
Söderbaum’s work on the Southern 
African Development Community (sadc) is 
oriented by the implementation of the New 
Regionalism Approach (nra)9, a theoretical 
approach that emphasises the importance of 
reflexivity, intersubjectivity and identity in 
the unfolding of regionalism and processes of 
region­building. The nra adopts a construc­
tivist framework that provides:
[A] theoretically rich and promising way of con­
ceptualizing the interaction between material incen­
tives, intersubjective structures and the identity and 
interests of the actors […] Interests are not pre­given 
but socially constructed […] constructivists argue that 
understanding intersubjective structures allows us to 
trace the ways whereby interests and identities change 
over time and new forms of cooperation and commu­
nity can emerge. The basic assumption is that there 
is an inevitable connection between the dynamics of 
collective action and the social identity by which the 
individual teams up with others in real or ‘imagined 
communities’ (Söderbaum, 2004, 44, the last sentence 
built on Anderson 1991).
9 Söderbaum has developed the nra in a close joint work with Björn Hettne (see for example Hettne and Söder­
baum, 1998, 2000). 
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Paraphrasing Wendt (1992), Söderbaum 
asserts that ‘regionalism is what actors make 
of it’:
The reflective capacity of concerned actors is 
seen as an important explanation for the emergence 
and quality of regionalism. In this way regionalization 
is seen as an instrument to change existing structures, 
take advantage of new opportunities that arise as well 
as to create bonds of identity and community. Accor­
ding to this perspective actors engage in regionalism 
not only on the basis of material incentives and re­
sources [...] but they are also motivated by ideas and 
identities (Söderbaum, 2004, 44­5, emphasis added).
Söderbaum agrees with Wendt (1992) 
that identities are at the basis of interests, 
by which he acknowledges that identity has 
constitutive power on interests. He emphasises 
that it is imperative to observe the historical 
formation of the Southern African region in 
order to understand how identities have been 
created, and he underlines the importance of 
acknowledging racial differentiations between 
whites and non­whites for understanding the 
political economy of the sadc (Kurki, 2008, 
ch. 4). However, he does not address the pro­
cess of collective identity formation as such, 
nor does he explain in a systematic fashion 
how identity influenced the creation of the 
sadc regionalist project. His main conclusion 
regarding the role of identity in orienting ac­
tors’ behaviour is that interests change through 
interaction and socialisation, inasmuch as ac­
tors develop a sense of belonging to the region 
(Söderbaum, 2004, 202). From Söderbaum’s 
analysis one can infer that collective identity 
played a constitutive role in actors’ interests 
towards regional institution building, and 
hence, we can observe that interests are the 
ideational factor through which identity can 
have causal power on the creation of regional 
institutions. In other words, it is not that 
identity generates regional institutions all by 
itself, but that identity, as a constitutive factor 
of interests, orients and informs such interests 
towards regional institution building. In this 
sense, identity can be assessed as having causal 
effects on institution building.
Another interesting element regarding the 
importance of identity in Söderbaum’s work 
is his conceptualisation of regime­boosting as 
a very significant reason why political leaders 
support regionalist initiatives. By engaging the 
rather intense and symbolic game of regiona­
lism, they can be perceived as promoters of the 
goals and values of regionalism and regional 
integration, which enables them to raise the 
profile and image of their often authoritarian 
regimes (Söderbaum, 2004, 96, 98). The aim 
of regime­boosting can be explained because of 
the inherent ‘weakness’ of most post­colonial 
states in Southern Africa, which “are overly 
concerned with absolute sovereignty as well as 
the formal status and survival of their regimes, 
rather than the promotion of the ‘national in­
terest’ in a broader sense and the achievement 
of national security” (Söderbaum, 2004, 96­
7). Hence, in the terms posed by Söderbaum, 
illegitimacy and ‘state weakness’ may work 
as sources of collective identity for Southern 
African political leaders, which leads them to 
promote regionalism mostly in its rhetorical 
dimension (p. 99). Yet, Söderbaum does not 
mention ‘identity’ in this passage and throug­
hout the book there is not any statement about 
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the casual power of identity over regional ins­
titution building.
Söderbaum acknowledges that identity 
is ambiguous and multiple and does not explain 
action itself: it rather informs and transforms 
individuals (and their behaviour and their 
interests) as well as the quality of interaction 
(Söderbaum, 2004, 45, emphasis mine). Sö­
derbaum coincides with constructivists in that 
identity is at the basis of interest formation, 
and thus identity plays a constitutive role in 
actors’ interests in regional institution buil­
ding. Indeed, Söderbaum tells us that identity 
motivates actors’ engagement with regionalism. 
If identity is a motivation then it can be con­
sidered a cause for action (Davidson, 1963; 
Wendt, 1999; Kurki, 2008)10. But at the same 
time Söderbaum claims that regionalisation 
processes can be seen as instruments to create 
‘bonds of identity and community’. Perhaps 
Söderbaum is thinking here of regionalist 
projects as well, since regionalisation is a more 
spontaneous process that can be hardly con­
sidered an ‘instrument’ intentionally used by 
specific actors (Hurrell, 1995, 334). Thus, in 
Söderbaum’s view, identity constitutes actors’ 
interests in developing processes of regiona­
lisation – and regionalist projects – while at 
the same time such processes and projects 
can be used as instruments to create ‘bonds’ 
of identity. He does not differentiate between 
relationships of constitution and causation in 
one way or another, but rather suggests that 
regionalisation (and regionalism) and identity 
may constitute and create each other, which 
gives an implicit idea of mutual constitution.
The case of regime­boosting accounts for 
another example of the constitutive and causal 
roles of a different kind of collective identity 
formation – the one of weak states deeply con­
cerned about strengthening their sovereignty 
and legitimacy. From Söderbaum’s analysis 
we can infer that collective identity around 
state ‘weakness’ and scarce legitimacy plays a 
powerful constitutive and causal role of state 
interest formation towards regionalism, as it 
motivates Southern African states to pursue 
the sadc project, even though Söderbaum 
does not make explicit claims about the causal 
powers of this source of identity (which in no 
case is treated by Söderbaum as such).
2.1 the concept of ‘regionness’
A significant contribution of the nra to the 
comprehension of region­building processes 
and the evolution of regionalism is the concept 
of ‘regionness’, where identity has an impor­
tant role to play. Hettne and Söderbaum define 
regionness as:
[T]he process whereby a geographical area is 
transformed from a passive object to an active subject 
capable of articulating the transnational interests of 
the emerging region. Regionness thus implies that a 
region can be a region ‘more or less’. The level of re­
gionness can both increase and decrease (Hettne and 
Söderbaum, 2000, 461).
10 The causal role of motives and reasons will be further discussed in the last section of the paper. 
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Accordingly, “The level of ‘regionness’ 
defines the position of a particular region or 
regional system in terms of regional coherence 
and identity […]” (Hettne, 2003, 28). There 
are five levels of regionness, where collective 
identity evolves altogether with deeper levels 
of regionness11:
i) The regional space, identified as a pri­
marily geographical unit delimited by 
more or less natural physical barriers 
and marked by ecological characteristics 
(like a proto­region). In such a territory, 
people develop a kind of translocal rela­
tionship.
ii) The regional complex, which emerges 
through increased social contacts and 
transactions between previously more 
isolated groups, giving place to patterns 
of economic interdependencies. The co­
llective memory of a more widespread 
identity, albeit confined to a relatively 
small elite, dissipates. This level is seen as 
the real starting point for a regionalisation 
process.
iii) The regional society, which is a de jure or 
formal region characterised by the ap­
pearance of a number of different actors 
apart from the states that move towards 
transcendence of national space, making 
use of a more rule­based pattern of re­
lations. Formal organisations and social 
institutions play a crucial role in this 
process leading towards community and 
region­building.
iv) The regional community, which is an active 
subject with a distinct identity, institutio­
nalised or informal actor capability, legi­
timacy and structure of decision­making 
in relation with a more or less responsive 
regional civil society, transcending the old 
state borders. A regional collective identi­
ty emerges and relations are characterised 
by mutual trust driven by social learning.
v) The region-state, or regional institutionali­
sed polity, which is a ‘hypothetical’ entity 
constituted out of a voluntary evolution 
of a group of formerly sovereign national 
communities into a new form of political 
entity where sovereignty is pooled for the 
best of all.
Hettne and Söderbaum do not aim to su­
ggest a stage theory, neither do they anticipate 
“a single path or detailed ‘series of stages’ that 
are exactly the same for all regions and that 
must be passed in order for higher levels of 
regionness to occur” (Hettne and Söderbaum, 
2000, 470). Nevertheless, these five levels of 
regionness denote a progressive identification 
of peoples with the region they live in, creating 
a sense of ’belonging’. Identification refers here 
to the degree to which the inhabitants of a re­
gion ‘feel’ they are part of that region, and the 
extent to which the region constitutes part of 
their identity towards the inhabitants of other 
11 The following descriptions of each level of regionness are just an edited transcription of the descriptions made by 
Hettne and Söderbaum in their 2000 article, pp. 462­8. They also contain some fragments of Van Langenhove refer­
ring to the work of Hettne and Söderbaum (van Langenhove, 2003, 11­2).
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regions. Identification can be understood in 
terms of regional cohesion, which means: (i) 
that the region plays a defining role in inter­
state relations (and in relations with other 
non­state actors), both within the region and 
with the rest of the world; and (ii) that the 
region serves as the organising base of a wide 
range of issues within the region (Söderbaum, 
2001, 50, quoting Hurrell, 1997). Regional 
cohesion is a useful category for understanding 
the extent to which the region shapes actors’ 
identities and interests, and it can be seen that 
it holds a direct relationship with the levels of 
regionness.
In the definition of each level of region­
ness it is easy to see that institution building 
deepens along with higher levels of regionness, 
thus establishing a direct relationship between 
the level of actors’ identification with the re­
gion and the development of more complex 
regional institutions ­ which in turn leads to 
higher levels of regional cohesion. It can be 
noted that regionalism, as a formal state project 
that entails a minimum of institution buil­
ding, starts at the level of the ‘regional society’ 
(though Hettne and Söderbaum do not make 
this explicit and there is no reason to think 
that a regionalist project could not emerge in 
a previous level of regionness). As in the case of 
Söderbaum’s (2004) previously reviewed work, 
we can appreciate here clear relationships of 
constitution, but not necessarily of causation. 
Hettne and Söderbaum suggest a relationship 
of mutual constitution between regionness 
and collective identity. They emphasise the 
dissipation of a ‘collective memory of a more 
widespread identity’ along a ‘small elite’ that 
occurs at the level of ‘regional complex’ as an 
incipient feature of regional identity forma­
tion. They also suggest a relationship of mutual 
constitution between collective identity and 
institution building, for both types of ideatio­
nal structures grow with every higher level of 
regionness. But Hettne and Söderbaum do not 
specify any relationship of causation between 
identity and institutions, nor do they clarify 
if it is regionalisation together with a greater 
collective identity which causes these structu­
res to enlarge or vice versa. Again, we may face 
a case of mutual constitution and causation, 
though one that leaves us uncertain about the 
concrete ways in which such relationships 
might work.
2.2 the concept of ‘regionhood’
The linkages between the levels of regionness 
and the rising of a regional identity can also 
be seen through the concept of ‘regionhood’ 
introduced by Luk Van Langenhove, for whom 
the five levels of regionness are to be seen as five 
phases in the process of ‘becoming’ a region 
(van Langenhove, 2003, 12). Accordingly, the 
concept of ‘regionhood’ serves to understand 
the agential capabilities of regions in the new 
regionalisms’ world order. Drawing on social 
psychology, van Langenhove understands re­
gionhood as those conditions which grant a 
region the capacity to act as a polity, namely, 
a corporate actor. These conditions are (i) the 
region as a system of intentional acts in the 
international and national arena; (ii) the region 
as a ‘rational’ system with statehood properties; 
(iii) the region as a reciprocal achievement; and 
(iv) the region as a generator and communica­
tor of meaning and identity. Such conditions 
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are the same characteristics that are said to be 
constitutive of personhood (pp. 14­5).
It is easy to infer that regionhood entails 
the existence of a regional identity that allows 
the region to act as unitary actor, as the region 
needs to define who it is in relation to other 
regions and actors in order to act as a corpo­
rate actor ­ condition (iv). Likewise, the four 
conditions of regionhood imply the existence 
of a more or less developed institutional fra­
mework that necessarily follows a regionalist 
project, and which allows the region to: (i) 
perform intentional acts; (ii) acquire state­
hood properties; and (iii and iv) allow the 
region to make visible its achievements as a 
generator and communicator of meaning and 
identity. Van Langenhove asserts that a region 
must express meaning towards other social 
and personal actors as well as possessing a 
particular identity (p. 23). Developing region­
hood entails developing a collective identity 
and institution building, but following Van 
Langnehove’s reasoning we remain uncertain 
whether the interest in acquiring regionhood 
causes the other two ideational structures or 
if it is the interest in developing a regional 
identity and institution building which leads 
to the consolidation of regionhood; nor does 
Van Langenhove enquire into the relationships 
of causation between identity and institutions, 
although their constitutive relationships are 
clearer to observe.
van Langenhove differentiates the concept 
of regionhood from the one of ‘regionality’. 
While regionhood allows the distinction of a 
region from a non­region, regionality corres­
ponds to the suitable historical, geographical, 
economic, cultural and social conditions that 
allow for a region to be distinguished from 
other regions, and thus, more equivalent to the 
concept of regionness outlined by Söderbaum 
and Hettne (van Langenhove, 2003, 9, 12). 
According to Marchand et al., regionality has to 
do with “the relative convergence of dimensions 
such as cultural affinity, political regimes, secu­
rity arrangements and economic policies (i.e. 
relative sameness). As such, it is the outcome of 
not one but several processes, and involves the 
creation of a regional identity” (Marchand et al., 
1999, 900). In this case, regionality, understood 
as those cultural features that distinguish one 
region from others, is clearly a consequence of 
the development of a regional identity, it is – at 
least partly – caused by the emergence of such 
identity. Yet, the concept of regionality does not 
tell us anything about the role of institutions, 
though one could infer that regional institu­
tions reflect those cultural features (identity) 
that configure regionality.
Both concepts of regionness and region­
hood entail an acknowledgement of the im­
portance of identity as a preceding factor that 
constitutes actors’ interests in pursuing regio­
nalism ­ and regional institution building. This 
is the view maintained in a previous work of 
mine on the role of ideas in the development 
of the Andean Community (ac) and Mercosur 
regionalist projects, which suggested a consti­
tutive and causal relationship between identity 
and regional institution building. In the case 
of the ac, I asserted that the common history 
of Andean countries, which were liberated by 
Simón Bolívar and were born independent as 
a single country – Gran Colombia – before be­
coming individual states in the 1830s, strongly 
marked the constitution of the Andean Pact 
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in 1969 and the subsequent re­launching of 
the Andean Community in the early 1990s 
(Prieto, 2003, 277). In the case of Mercosur, 
I proposed that the common recent history of 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone provided 
a basis for the creation of a collective identity 
that helped the rise of the regionalist project 
in 1991 as a way to strengthen the demo­
cratisation processes that began to occur in 
the Southern Cone since the mid 1980s (pp. 
280­1)12. Since my analysis held the view that 
collective identity preceded the creation of the 
ac and Mercosur, it implicitly suggested that 
identity was a cause of regional institution 
building, as different types of identity infor­
med state interests towards such endeavour 
and such identities motivated states to group 
together. Yet, the relationships of constitution 
and causation between identity and institu­
tions remained undistinguished.
3. institutions Causing 
regional identity
This section reviews the work of some cons­
tructivists who have addressed the process of 
European regional integration showing that 
eu institutions have socialisation and learning 
effects that lead to the formation of collective 
identity. It also reviews the work of Amitav 
Acharya on the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (asean) regionalist project, 
which claims that state interests on regional 
institution building were not constituted by 
the previous existence of a collective identity 
in South East Asia, but in turn further regio­
nal institution building led to the formation 
of a collective regional identity among asean 
member states.
3.1 Collective identity formation 
through socialisation within institutional 
environments: the case of the eu
In one of his studies, Jeffrey T. Checkel inqui­
res about the reasons why states comply with 
regional norms. His constructivist approach 
emphasises social learning, socialisation and 
social norms (Checkel, 2001, 553). The main 
argument is that “norms matter in a constitu­
tive, interest­shaping way not captured by ra­
tionalist arguments” (p. 554). Checkel points 
out to persuasion as the prevailing mechanism 
through which compliance occurs. Checkel su­
ggests that the reason why states comply with 
regional norms is because norms constitute sta­
te interests. Checkel argues that the historical 
and institutional context, and the experience 
that bureaucrats have on the issue area at play 
in a particular moment, determine to a high 
extent the ways in which such bureaucrats 
comply with regional norms (p. 573).
Although Checkel does not mention 
identity in this analysis, it is not difficult to 
incorporate identity in it. If one considers 
Berger and Luckmann’s argument about the 
need of roles for creating and developing ins­
titutions, and the identification that agents 
generate towards the roles they assume (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1968, 96­7), it is possible to 
12 This view was drawn directly from the works of Cammack (1999) and Hirst (1999). 
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infer from Checkel’s analysis that institutional 
environments make bureaucrats identify with 
each other and with the purpose of their job 
and carry out the tasks that institutions impose 
on them, including compliance with norms. In 
these terms, institutions create a ‘bureaucratic’ 
collective identity, which would correspond 
to a state identity in the sense that a state acts 
through the bureaucrats that represent it and 
act in its name (Finnemore, 1996, 2; Wendt, 
1999, ch. 5). Hence, Checkel’s explanation 
could be summarised as follows: norms that 
constitute state interests make agents iden­
tify with them, and this is why they comply 
with regional norms. In other words, Checkel 
suggests that the constitutive role of norms 
becomes causal as it makes agents (state bu­
reaucrats) identify with such norms. In this 
sense, norms create collective identity and 
explain state action.
Following a 1996 Eurobarometer study, 
Brigid Laffan asserts that eu institutions have a 
socialisation effect, as 94 per cent of European 
top decision makers stated that their country’s 
membership was a ‘good’ thing, and 90 per 
cent believed that their country had benefited 
from membership. Accordingly, “These figures 
were far higher than recorded among the wider 
population, and there was far less interstate 
variation than found in the attitudes of the 
mass public” (Laffan, 2004, 76­7). Thomas 
Risse also finds that identification with and 
support for the eu and its institutions are 
higher among political and social elites than 
in the larger public (Risse, 2004, 260). He 
explains this difference as “Policy makers and 
government officials on all levels of governance 
spend a considerable amount of time dealing 
with the eu” as a result of which the eu has “a 
real psychological existence” for the European 
elites (p. 261).
In a former work, Risse showed his con­
cern about the ways in which national and 
European identities mould each other and how 
identity changes with the progressive cons­
truction of the eu. His starting point was the 
concept of ‘entitativity’, which suggests that 
“the more salient a social context becomes, the 
more people identify with the respective social 
group (or strongly reject it)13. This leads to the 
proposition that levels of identification with or 
conscious rejection of Europe should increase, 
the more important the eu becomes in peoples’ 
lives” (Risse, 2000, 4, referring to the work of 
Castano, reference omitted in the original)14. 
Risse points out that there is a ‘constructivist 
story’ about the ways in which the eu and its 
institutions shape collective identities. Such 
a story endogenises identities, interests and 
institutions, as over time institutions “become 
part and parcel of the social and power structu­
re that form the social environment in which 
people act” (Risse, 2004, 263). Accordingly:
Institutions tend to have constitutive effects on 
corporate actors such as national governments and 
13 See p.8 above. The definition that Van Langenhove provides of this concept is slightly different from the one 
provided by Risse, but I find both complementary and not contradictory whatsoever. 
14 For a later version of the work of Castano and the use of the concept of ‘entitativity’ see Castano (2004).
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interest groups, but also on individuals. Since people 
act in an environment structured by the institutions, 
the latter affect their interests, preferences and co­
llective identities. We should then expect identities 
and institutions to coevolve, with the causal arrows 
between the two pointing in both directions (Risse, 
2004, 263, emphasis original).
Risse’s constructivist view on the causal 
effects of institutions over identity is shown 
in a more recent work, where he holds that:
[T]he eu as an emergent polity is expected not 
just to constrain the range of choices available to, say, 
nation states, but the way in which they define their 
interests and even their identities. eu ‘membership 
matters’ […] in that it influences the very way in 
which actors see themselves and are seen by others as 
special beings (Risse, 2009, 148).
Risse finds that “support for European 
integration and attachment to Europe appear 
to be closely related, motivating European 
elites to continue on the path of institution 
building” (Risse, 2004, 270, emphasis added). 
However, Risse warns against excessively op­
timistic statements about European identity, 
for there remains a lot to know about the 
precise causal relationships and mechanisms 
between European integration and European 
identity, and he acknowledges that the existing 
literature on European identity in general is 
less concerned with linking the development 
of a European identity with the evolution of 
European institutions (pp. 270­1). Indeed, 
the causal power of institutional environments 
and the identification effects they generate on 
norm compliance are questioned by Risse’s 
finding of no immediate connection between 
the level of elite identification with Europe 
and national policies toward the eu in general, 
considering the scant correlation between Eu­
ropean identities among elites and the degree 
of compliance with eu law (Risse, 2000, 17, 
drawing on a data base developed at the Euro­
pean University Institute ­ Börzel).
The reviewed constructivist approaches to 
European regionalism clearly acknowledge the 
causal power of regional institutions in genera­
ting collective identity, especially emphasising 
the socialisation effects that eu institutions 
have on national and regional bureaucrats. eu 
institutions are also considered to have cons­
titutive effects on state interest formation. The 
reviewed authors emphasise the effects of exis­
ting institutions on the formation of collective 
identity, but do not enquire into the ways in 
which a previous collective identity – which is 
often attached to Europe as a region (Smith, 
1990, 187), played a constitutive/causal role 
in the creation and development of regional 
institutions. They only claim that, once insti­
tutions are created, they have constitutive and 
causal effects on collective identity formation, 
and this in turn reinforces institution building 
(although not necessarily norm compliance, as 
Risse’s finding pointed out), which derives in 
a process of mutual constitution and causa­
tion between collective identity and regional 
institutions.
3.2 regional norms creating collective 
identity: the case of the asean
A salient example of a constructivist analysis 
that emphasises the causal role of regional 
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norms in the creation of collective identity is 
Amitav Acharya’s study of the asean regionalist 
project. Acharya intends to explain the unfol­
ding of the asean through the application of 
the concept of ‘security community’ coined 
by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, that “describes 
groups of states which have developed a long­
term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled 
out the use of force in settling disputes with 
other members of the group” (Acharya, 2009, 
1). Acharya focuses primarily on the role of 
norms, and, to a lesser extent, of identity, in 
orienting Southeast Asian states’ behaviour 
towards the development of the asean. Since 
the asean regionalist project has not developed 
a broad or complex institutional framework of 
diverse decision­making organisms15, Acharya 
focuses on the analysis of norms as the main 
regional institutions existing. Ontologically, 
norms are assessed to operate as constitutive 
factors of identities and identity is also created 
by norms. Accordingly:
Norms not only ‘regulate’ state behaviour […] 
but also redefine state interests and constitute state 
identities, including the development of collective 
identities. By focusing on the constitutive effects of 
norms, constructivism has thus restored some of the 
original insights of integration theory regarding the 
impact of socialisation in creating collective interests 
and identities […] norms play a crucial role in the so­
cialisation process leading to peaceful conduct among 
states, which form the core of security communities 
(Acharya, 2009, 4, emphasis added).
As can be seen in the previous quote, 
Acharya indiscriminately interchanges terms 
regarding constitution and causation (the 
term ‘creation’ might refer to both types of 
effects)16, maybe because he assumes that if 
B is constituted by A, then B is automatically 
caused by A. Given this, we must assume that 
Acharya considers that norms constitute and 
cause identity, without necessarily assuming 
that he considers constitution and causation 
to be the same thing.
Acharya aims as well to examine identi­
ty formation in the asean by “looking at the 
claims made by asean elites about regionally 
specific ways of problem solving and coo­
peration” (Acharya, 2009, 7), by which he 
explicitly acknowledges that state identity is 
what state representatives ­ which he equates to 
‘elites’ ­ claim it is. Yet, his emphasis is clearly 
on norms as the main explanatory variable in 
his study, as he intends to “[…] analyse sys­
tematically the role of asean’s norms in the 
management of regional order and their effect 
on the development of collective interests and 
identities” (p. 9, emphasis mine)17. Identity 
15 Acharya (2009, 6­7) speaks of an ‘organisational minimalism’ and a ‘soft institutionalism’ that characterise the 
‘asean Way’.
16 The last section of the paper will discuss the possibility of considering the creation of things as a form of causa­
tion. Suffice it to say, up to this point, that following the Humean conception of causation, if B is created by A then 
we must accept that B was, at least partly, caused by A.
17 Note that “the effect” of norms on interests and identities that Acharya aims to assess can be both constitutive 
and/or causal.
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is not taken as a main explanatory variable: 
at least, it must be understood as something 
that is first partly constituted and created by 
norms in order to further understand its role as 
an ideational factor orienting state behaviour. 
Acharya’s main hypothesis reads as follows:
asean’s frameworks of interaction and socialisa­
tion have themselves become a crucial factor affecting 
the interests and identities of its members. The idea 
of security community, sociologically understood, 
enables us to analyse asean as a regional institution 
which both regulates and constitutes the interests 
and policies of its members in matters of war, peace 
and cooperation. asean’s role in regional order can 
be studied and evaluated by looking at the extent 
to which its norms and socialisation processes, and 
identity­building initiatives, have shaped the attitu­
des and behaviour of its members about conflict and 
order in the region, and the extent to which they have 
led to the development of common understandings, 
expectations and practices about peaceful conduct 
(Acharya, 2009, 9, emphasis added).
The verbs emphasised in the previous 
quotation like ‘affecting’, ‘regulating’, ‘shaping’ 
and ‘leading’ give a sense of causation, and 
Acharya tells us that institutions also constitute 
asean members’ interests. At the end of his 
book he concludes that the existence of certain 
norms, such as the principle of non­interfe­
rence, regional solutions to regional problems, 
informality, bilateralism in defence relations, 
regional autonomy and other principles con­
forming the so­called ‘asean Way’ (Acharya, 
2009, 287), help understand why the asean 
has been ‘successful’ in organising the re­
gion along certain political lines. Acharya’s 
approach puts the main explanatory weight 
on norms, to the point that asean norms are 
considered to be the main constitutive factors 
of collective regional identity, inasmuch as they 
help its creation. If norms help the creation of 
identity, it is implied that norms cause such 
identity, at least partly. Acharya even suggests 
that building a common identity was an expli­
cit aim of state leaders through the creation of 
asean norms (Acharya, 2009, 37). Although 
the former conceptualisation of a security com­
munity advanced by Deutsch contemplated its 
formation as a result of a process of integration 
where high volumes of transactions – political, 
cultural or economic – existed, Acharya asserts 
that “asean evolved as a sort of an ‘imagined 
community’, despite low initial levels of inter­
dependence and transactions, and the existen­
ce of substantial political and situational diffe­
rences among its members” (Acharya, 2009, 
286). Yet, he concludes that “[…] the vision of 
community preceded rather than resulted from 
political, strategic and functional interactions 
and interdependence” (p. 286). In these terms, 
the question that crucially arises is: why did 
the idea of an ‘imagined’ community precede 
interdependence and interaction? How was 
such idea formed? Acharya attributes the main 
explanation to the role of norms:
Central to this process was a set of norms, among 
which non­interference, non­use of force, regional 
autonomy, the avoidance of collective defence and 
the practice of the ‘asean Way’ were the most salient 
[…] While some of these norms were adapted from 
universal legal­rational principles, others had their 
sources in what asean’s founders claimed to be the 
unique socio-cultural practices of the region. Together 
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they led to the emergence of what its members claimed 
to be a ‘cultural­specific’ and sociological approach to 
conflict management and decision making, called the 
‘asean Way’. This turned out to be a key symbol of 
asean, helping the grouping to overcome intra­mural 
tensions especially during the crucial early years of 
asean […] Subsequently, the asean Way was useful 
in attracting new members and persuading aseans 
external dialogue partners to see things from an asean 
perspective, as well as in muting substantive areas of 
disagreement (Acharya 2009: 286, emphasis added).
Following Acharya, the ‘asean Way’ is the 
product of normative settings, made of norms, 
and these constitute a source of collective 
identity for asean member states. According 
to the previous quotation, the ‘asean Way’ is 
the collective identity of member states, it is 
what regional collective identity is made of. In 
Acharya’s view, asean countries have even con­
sidered that not fulfilling one of their norms 
would lead to a loss of asean identity (Acharya, 
2009, 196). Thus, in Acharya’s terms, regio­
nal norms and collective identity seem to be 
the same thing, inasmuch as the source of the 
asean identity is constituted and caused by 
the regional norms that constitute the ‘asean 
Way’. If this is the case, under a Humean con­
ception of causation it would only be possible 
to claim that asean norms constitute asean’s 
collective identity, but not that asean norms 
caused such collective identity, as the condition 
of an independent existence between the cause 
and the effect would be violated.
But furthermore, when Acharya men­
tions that regional norms “had their sources 
in what asean’s founders claimed to be the 
unique socio­cultural practices of the region”, 
would such socio­cultural practices not ac­
count for the existence of a previous collective 
identity in the region? Unfortunately, this is 
not discussed in Acharya’s work. Nonetheless, 
Acharya even refers to certain issues that could 
account for the existence of a previous collec­
tive identity among asean states. Accordingly, 
the doctrine of non­interference in national 
affairs, which made part of the asean Way, 
can only be understood in the context of the 
domestic security concerns of the asean states:
As new political entities with ‘weak’ state struc­
tures (e.g. lack of a close congruence between ethnic 
groups and territorial boundaries) and an equally 
problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy, the 
primary sources of threat to the national security of 
the asean states were not external, but internal […] 
No framework for regional security cooperation 
could be meaningful for asean unless it countered 
the internal enemy and enhanced regime security 
(Acharya, 2009, 71).
Acharya also tells us that “The establish­
ment of asean was the product of a desire by 
its five original members to create a mechanism 
for war prevention and conflict management” 
(Acharya, 2009, 58), and that asean member 
states were also concerned about the emer­
gence of China as the dominant force in the 
region. These states were also worried about 
being left out of the Sino­Soviet competition 
for hegemony in South East Asia. Acharya 
then asserts that around these two security 
issues asean countries appreciated “the need 
for a united response to the new form of Great 
Power rivalry” (p. 64). However, although the­
se common concerns could count as sources of 
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collective identity, Acharya just chooses not to 
use the term ‘identity’ to name them.
Acharya acknowledges that “Identity 
had been a concern of South East Asian lea­
ders even before the creation of asean. [Some 
of them] also believed that South East Asia 
should have a distinctive place in the Asian 
regional order and therefore an identity of 
its own” (Acharya, 2009, 86). He even tells 
us that Ceylon was invited to join the asean 
in 1967, despite it not being considered to 
belong geographically to the Southeast Asian 
region, “presumably because its size, influen­
ce and resources did not threaten asean’s own 
identity or cohesion […]” (p. 62, emphasis 
added). Crucially, Acharya does not enquire 
into the possible existence of distinct sources 
of collective identity among asean states be­
fore the configuration of the asean in 1967. 
However, Acharya asserts that “Some scholars 
and policy­makers view the asean Way as a 
by­product of cultural similarities among the 
asean societies” (p. 78). One Malaysian former 
Foreign Minister spoke of a ‘common cultural 
heritage’ and of a ‘spirit of togetherness’ as a 
key factor that forms the basis of the establis­
hment of the asean (p. 78). Estrella Solidum, 
who Acharya considers to be the first scholar 
that seriously studied the term, asserted that 
the asean Way ‘consisted of cultural elements 
which are found to be congruent with some 
values of each of the member states’ (ibid., 
quoting the work of Solidum 1981). Not­
withstanding, Acharya tells us that:
… the ‘cultural’ underpinnings of the asean 
Way of managing disputes and advancing security 
cooperation could be overstated. Several elements of 
the asean Way are hardly different from the ordinary 
qualities of pragmatism and flexibility that are found 
in national decision­making styles in other cultural 
settings. Moreover, the so­called cultural underpin­
nings of the asean Way are not fixed or static, but 
have been subject to continuous adjustment in res­
ponse to national, regional and global developments 
(Acharya, 2009, 79).
Yet, by equating the ‘cultural under­
pinnings’ of the asean Way to ‘the ordinary 
qualities of pragmatism and flexibility that 
are found in national decision­making styles 
in other cultural settings’, Acharya is unable 
to rule out the possibility that such settings 
account for a source of collective identity, even 
more when Acharya himself acknowledges that 
legal­rational norms – that are also shared by 
states belonging to other cultural settings – 
fostered the creation of asean norms. Further­
more, Acharya does not engage in a thorough 
study of those cultural underpinnings sugges­
ted by the scholar he first quoted, but he only 
‘forces’ the reader to forget about the possibility 
that cultural settings could account as a form 
of collective identity, and to concentrate solely 
on the explanatory role of norms.
In these terms, not only does Acharya 
emphasise the role of norms, but he also dis­
cards identity. The question that arises is: what 
was asean’s identity at the time the regionalist 
project was created? Acharya does not say. He 
just concludes that:
… the concept of an asean identity was to be 
derived substantively from its socialisation process. 
The asean Way itself resulted not so much from preor­
dained cultural sources […] but from incremental 
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socialisation. It emerged not only from the princi­
ples of interstate relations agreed to by the founders 
of asean, but also from a subsequent and long­term 
process of interaction and adjustment. Thus, in the 
case of asean, it was not so much that culture created 
norms, norms also created culture. As Malaysia’s Fo­
reign Minister, Abdullah Badawi, would put it later, 
asean’s ‘norms have become very much part of the 
asean culture’ (Acharya, 2009, 86).
Hence, the question of why asean mem­
ber states were able to advance in the consoli­
dation of their normative principles, even mo­
re, while facing the ‘absence’ of a pre­existing 
collective identity, remains unanswered18. In 
the end, Acharya succeeds in showing the 
importance of norms and the necessity of stu­
dying their role in pursuing regionalism, but 
he does not provide an explanation of why 
norms are sometimes fulfilled and sometimes 
not, nor does he assess the role of identity 
when norms were created in the first place. 
Answering such questions seems necessary if 
a collective identity is conceptualised precisely 
as the sharing of a set of norms. How do we 
explain the creation of such norms and the 
interest in constructing a collective identity?
Lastly, a significant difference between 
Acharya’s approach and the ones engaged by 
the reviewed constructivists working on the 
eu, is that Acharya stresses the role of norms 
in constituting and creating regional identity 
without the creation of large institutional 
organisations that allow for interaction and 
socialisation of national and regional bureau­
crats. In contrast, the eu has complex regional 
institutions, such as the Commission, the Par­
liament and the several Councils and Commit­
tees that allow for such processes to occur. This 
fact shows that Acharya’s study acknowledges 
greater constitutive and causal power of norms. 
But simultaneously, this insight raises more 
questions about the possible identity­related 
reasons that led asean leaders to the creation 
of regional norms and their interests in their 
enforcement through time. In other words, 
Acharya tells us that norms constitute and are 
capable of creating regional identity, but he 
does not tell us much about the role of identity 
in the creation of such norms in the first place.
The final section of the paper will show 
that the confusion between relationships of 
constitution and causation present in the re­
viewed constructivist analyses of regionalism 
can be overcome if the conceptualisation of 
causation is broadened and different types 
of causes are distinguished. Furthermore, a 
reflection on the need to bracket ideational 
structures and agency will be provided in order 
to improve the capability of constructivism to 
explain and understand why and how regio­
nalism unfolds.
4. expanding the borders of Causation
Section 2 reviewed the works of some authors 
(Söderbaum, Hettne and Van Langenhove) 
who hold that the formation process of a 
region – regionalisation, entails the develop­
ment of a regional collective identity, which 
18 Indeed, none of the questions Acharya poses for developing his study relate to this issue (Acharya, 2009, 7, 9). 
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may derive on actors willing to pursue regio­
nalism and subsequent institution building 
that leads the region to act as a unitary actor. 
In these terms, it can be said that collective 
identity precedes regionalism and institution 
building. Nonetheless, the reviewed authors do 
not make explicit that regional institutions are 
created because of the existence of a previous 
collective identity, this is, they do not explicitly 
acknowledge causal power of collective identi­
ty on institution building. Thus, the effects of 
collective identity over regional institutions are 
initially constitutive, but not necessarily cau­
sal, the latter understood under the Humean 
conception of causation. Yet, though none of 
these authors claim that collective identity is 
a necessary condition for regional institution 
building, from their works we can infer that, 
when it exists, identity can be assessed as ha­
ving causal effects. As stated in Section 1, ‘soft’ 
constructivism aims to provide both constitu­
tive and causal explanations. If actors’ interests 
in creating regional institutions arise because 
they share a collective identity, then regional 
institutions could be understood as being cau-
sed by such identity, and therefore, explained.
Section 3 reviewed the works of some 
constructivist scholars working on European 
regionalism who show the socialisation effects 
that eu institutions have over bureaucrats 
working at the national and regional levels. 
Socialisation processes cause the development 
of a collective identity among bureaucrats wor­
king both at regional institutions and at the 
national level. eu institutions are assessed as 
creators of a collective identity, and once this 
identity starts developing, it reinforces regional 
institution building, giving way to conceptua­
lising a relationship of mutual constitution and 
causation between identity and institutions. 
Furthermore, Acharya’s study of the asean 
claims that regional institutions were created in 
the absence of a pre­existing collective identity 
among state members (although he does not 
explore the possible sources of such identity 
that he mentions), and that such identity was 
instead generated by the creation of regional 
institutions. All these authors acknowledge the 
constitutive and causal power of institutions 
on agents’ interests, and by looking at actors’ 
interests they assess regional institutions as 
creators of collective identity, inasmuch as the 
actors increasingly identify themselves with 
the institutions they create and reproduce, 
and with their roles as members of the group 
of states that share such regional institutions.
None of the reviewed authors show spe­
cial concern about distinguishing relationships 
of constitution from relationships of causation 
between identity and institutions, and the ge­
neral impression given by the whole set of the 
reviewed constructivist analyses of regionalism 
is that ‘everything can explain everything’, 
even more in those cases where relationships 
of mutual constitution and causation between 
identity and institutions are suggested. By 
‘everything explains everything’ I mean that 
when it is possible to assess the existence of 
structures of collective identity and processes 
of institution building by simply claiming that 
relationships of mutual constitution and cau­
sation exist between identity and institutions, 
constructivism tells us little about how and 
in what terms these two ideational structures 
constitute and cause each other. In a constituti­
ve relationship, the existence of a factor entails 
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the existence of the whole, it is intrinsic to it, 
and thus there is no independent existence 
and no previous existence in time between 
the constitutive factor and the whole. In stres­
sing relationships of mutual constitution and 
causation between identity and institutions, 
constructivism is thus violating an indispen­
sable condition of causation, which is the in­
dependent existence between cause and effect, 
and the precedence of the former in relation to 
the latter (Suganami, 2006, 65, 71). Yet, when 
the reviewed authors stress the constitutive role 
of identity over institutions, there is a sense or 
precedence; the same happens with those re­
viewed authors that acknowledge constitutive 
power of institutions on identity: first there 
were EU institutions, or asean norms, and 
then collective identity began to emerge, or 
so the argument goes, as the possibility for the 
existence of a previous collective identity be­
fore the creation of eu institutions and asean 
norms is not addressed. This analysis shows 
in clear fashion that for most constructivist 
analyses, assessing relationships of constitution 
imply indeed relationships of causation.
In her enlightening work from 2008, Mil­
ja Kurki shows that the apparent contradiction 
and confusion between constitutive and causal 
theorising is due to an excluding attachment 
of the conceptualisation of cause to the Hu­
mean conception of causation. In turn, she 
suggests that ir theory, and particularly cons­
tructivism – as she finds it the most promising 
approach for doing this ­ must broaden its 
conceptualisation of causation drawing on the 
philosophical doctrine of ‘critical’ (also called 
‘scientific’) realism and reclaiming Aristotle’s 
conceptualisation of causes. Accordingly, cri­
tical realism is needed for two reasons: one, 
to acknowledge the structural constraints 
that material conditions pose to agency; and 
two, to assess the causal powers of empirically 
unobservable structures, such as ideas. Aristo­
telian conceptualisation of cause is needed in 
order to acknowledge that there are different 
types of causes, and that such types are usually 
present together in social life, thus enlarging 
the room for assessing multi­causation (Kurki, 
2008, ch. 1).
Following Kurki (2008, 12), Aristotle 
proposed four types of causes: material, for­
mal, efficient and final. Material causes are 
those conditions that physically enable and/
or constrain agency, i.e. the raw material with 
which a sculpture is made. Formal causes refer 
to the shape that an object must take in order 
to acquire the meaning as such an object, i.e. 
a house must have some kind of walls and roof 
and a door in order to be recognised as a house. 
Efficient causes refer to the mechanisms by 
which things change from one state to another, 
like ‘pushing and pulling’ forces, i.e. the me­
chanism by which cold water in a pot turns 
into vapour (heating). Lastly, final causes refer 
to the motives and reasons that made an agent 
willing to carry out a particular action, i.e. the 
sculptor carves a stone figure because he/she 
wanted to praise a god (Kurki, 2008, ch. 6). 
By these definitions, the only one that matches 
the Humean conception of causation is the one 
corresponding to ‘efficient’ cause. Effectively, 
an object’s change of state needs to be preceded 
by an external factor that produced such chan­
ge. In turn, material and formal causes have a 
greater constitutive character, inasmuch as they 
make possible that an object is so – its existen­
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ce. Yet, in Aristotle’s view, to ‘make possible’ 
entails a causal relationship, inasmuch as such 
conditions of possibility enable the existence 
of the object, its creation (Kurki, 2008, 220). 
Finally, and perhaps the most problematic is­
sue for social and IR theory, the definition of 
final causes grants causal power to motives and 
reasons, something overtly rejected by many 
postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars.
The issue of final causes is problematic 
because constructivism emphasises ideas as the 
most important constitutive and casual factors 
of agency and social structures. And it is in the 
category of final causes where ideas such as rea­
sons and motives mostly fit. Ideas are not ma­
terial conditions, although Kurki and Wendt 
open the possibility to think of the material 
implications of certain social structures, like 
capitalism or slavery (Kurki, 2008, 139, 228­9, 
258; Wendt, 1999, 95). Ideas are formal causes 
inasmuch as they constitute the meaning of 
objects (material and non­material), as they 
constitute language, and express the terms in 
which social things are defined, i.e. a house, a 
book, a war, a family19. But crucially, ideas can 
only be assessed as efficient causes inasmuch as 
they are final causes20. In other words, we can 
only be sure about the causal power of ideas 
as efficient causes if we can know that agents 
hold them, and this can only be acknowled­
ged by observing agents’ discourse. Hence, we 
can observe a more constitutive role of ideas 
by assessing the ways in which they operate as 
material and formal causes ­ granting meaning 
to material and non­material factors; and a 
more causal role (closer but not too much to 
the Humean conception of causation) when 
they operate as final­efficient causes.
Postmodernist and poststructuralist scho­
lars usually reject the conception of motives 
and reasons as causes because they follow 
a Wittgesteinian view according to which 
reasons are cases of rule­following, which do 
not have an independent existence from the 
actions they motivate. In turn, the philoso­
phical doctrine of critical realism defends the 
causal power of reasons, arguing that in most 
cases agency would have not taken place if they 
had been absent, and that the justifying power 
that reasons provide to agents acts as a strong 
internal force (motivation) to carry out certain 
actions. Donald Davidson (1963) poses the 
case of explaining why an individual turned on 
the lights of his living room. Davidson tells us 
that the cause why the individual turned on the 
lights was because he wanted to warn a suspi­
cious person that was prowling the outside of 
his house, that someone else was in the house 
in order to deter his intentions to rob it. A 
Wittgesteinian explanation of this case would 
say that the individual was just following a 
rule that says “if I turn on the lights the person 
19 ‘Social things’ refer here to all those categories of meaning that entail human interaction, this is, they exist only 
for human beings, and in this sense are not part of the natural world in case human beings did not exist. Drawing on 
Currie, Wendt provides a definition of social kinds as all those “physical objects that have a social function” (Wendt, 
1999, 68).
20 I draw this argument from Aristotle’s acknowledgement that final causes – the ends and purposes ‘for the sake of 
which a thing is’­ are closely associated with efficient causes, as Kurki asserts (Kurki, 2008, 222).
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outside my house will know someone is in the 
house and will think twice before deciding to 
enter my house to rob it”, and surely another 
rule that says “if you see someone prowling 
your house, you should alert him because he 
might be a thief”. Davidson claims that the 
cause why the individual turned on the lights 
is not that someone was prowling his house, 
but rather that he thought that someone could 
be a thief and thus he wanted to alert him. The 
individual’s suspicion and his will of preven­
ting a robbery was the reason why he turned on 
the light. This reason might not have been the 
only cause that explains his action, but David­
son claims that if such reason had been absent, 
the individual would have not turned on the 
lights (Davidson, 1963, 691, 695).
In assessing the causal power of reasons 
and motives, I do not see why constructivists – 
and social theorists in general – need to adopt 
a position pro or contra the Wittgesteinian 
view of reasons as cases of rule­following. For 
in social life, cases where there is only one rule 
to follow are rather scarce. Most of the times, 
agents have a diverse range of rules to follow. 
They must often choose what rules to follow. 
In their exercise of choosing, agents give to 
themselves – and often to other agents – rea­
sons that justify their choosing in moral and 
ethical terms. When dealing with a conflict 
with someone else, an individual usually has 
the option of being more or less understan­
ding and more or less aggressive. For instance, 
there might be a rule that says “if you caught 
your girlfriend cheating on you with one of 
your friends, you should break up with both”. 
Another rule could say “in such a case, you 
should beat up your friend, or do the same 
to him that he did to you in revenge”. But 
other rules might command less aggressive 
and avenging attitudes. The individual may 
choose some and not others, and finally what 
counts for the researcher intending to explain 
the individual’s conduct is not only the set of 
rules that might have informed the individual’s 
behaviour, but also, and crucially, the reasons 
provided by the individual to justify his/her be­
haviour21, even if those reasons are also cases of 
rule­following. In other words, by acknowled­
ging the causal power of reasons one does not 
need to deny the constraining, constitutive and 
causal power of rules.
The previous reflections lead to the con­
clusion that, as pointed out by Kurki, consti­
tutive theorising is actually a form of causal 
theorising22, inasmuch as constitutive factors 
enable the existence of those things they cons­
titute (material and formal types of causes in 
Aristotle’s conceptualisation) (Kurki, 2008, 
ch. 6). If this position is accepted, the confu­
sion between constitution and causation in 
constructivist analyses can be overcome. For 
what is needed, thus, is not a clear­cut differen­
tiation between relationships of constitution 
from relationships of causation, but rather the 
differentiation of different types of more cons­
21 See Davidson (1963, 691­2).
22 Note that this coincides with Steve Smith’s view on Wendt’s work (Smith 2000, 157), although Smith intended 
to raise this point as a critique.
 pi Rev Oasis 17_final.indb   31 2/5/14   11:01 AM
H o w  d o E s  r E g i o n a l i s m  u n f o l d ?
3 2
titutive (material and formal) and more trans-
formative23 (efficient and final) causes. In other 
words, if we accept Aristotle’s different types of 
causes, constitutive theorising – as understood 
by reflectivists, postmodernists, interpretivists 
and poststructuralists – on the one hand, and 
causal theorising – as understood by positivists 
and rationalists under the Humean conception 
of causation – on the other, are possible to 
combine, and so enabling constructivism’s aim 
of combining ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’. 
But this task is by no means easy, and it poses 
serious challenges.
4.1 ‘bracketing’ for ‘explaining’ (and 
‘understanding’)
Constructivism’s acknowledgement of rela­
tionships of mutual constitution and causation 
between collective identity and regional insti­
tutions is acceptable as a point of departure, 
an ontological position, but this does not tell 
us anything concrete about the ways in which 
the relationships of constitution and causation 
– the latter understood in a more Humean 
conception of efficient cause ­ between identity 
and institutions actually work, since, ontologi­
cally, they can work in any way. As Finnemore 
points out:
Constructivism is […] the most amorphous 
and least defined of the perspectives emphasizing the 
causal nature of social structures […] constructivists 
investigate a wide variety of social structural elements, 
and it is not clear how these different aspects of social 
structures relate to one another either conceptually or 
substantively. Conceptually, the relationships among 
principles, norms, institutions, identities, roles and 
rules are not well defined […] These scholars […] 
investigate social structures in the plural with little 
attention to questions about the relations among 
specific social elements – whether they can exist inde­
pendently or whether they must appear as a part of a 
mutually reinforcing collection of norms, institutions 
and discourse (Finnemore, 1996, 16).
The previous quotation gives a clear pic­
ture of constructivism’s risks – and frequent 
results – of under­explanation and under­
specification. Instead of attempting to make 
predictions about agency and finding regulari­
ty patterns in agents’ behaviour, constructivism 
must work on a case­by­case basis describing 
the ways in which ideational structures explain 
agency, and the ways in which such ideational 
structures constitute and cause each other 
through their interplay at the process of agents’ 
interests formation and their role in orienting 
agents’ behaviour. This role can only be as­
sessed by observing agents’ discourse and its 
relation to agents’ deeds. For agents’ discourse 
is a crucial element that the researcher must 
observe in order to know agents’ interests. Yet, 
agents can ‘lie’ to others – and even to themsel­
ves – and may not be keen on recognising the 
ideas that informed their behaviour as reasons 
23 The term ‘transformative’ is not used in any case by Kurki, and it is only my responsibility to propose it. It intends 
to give the sense of ‘change of state’ characteristic of efficient causes, and of final causes (reasons and motives) that 
justify agents’ actions that ‘transform’ or ‘change’ the state of things. 
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for actions. Thus, assessing the ideational so­
cial structures in which agents interact is also 
necessary in order to assess the causal power – 
both constitutive and transformative ­ of ideas.
In these terms, my claim is not that 
constructivism cannot or should not combi­
ne causal and constitutive theorising in the 
terms of ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ 
posed by Hollis and Smith. My claim is that, 
following Kurki’s view, constructivism needs 
to broaden its conceptualisation of causation 
and differentiate types of causes engaging the 
Aristotelian classification. Turning back to the 
acknowledgement of relationships of mutual 
constitution and causation between identity 
and institutions made by the above reviewed 
constructivist analyses of regionalism, my 
claim is not that such relationships cannot 
be ontologically warranted, but rather that in 
order to understand how such relationships 
work, constructivism must ‘bracket’ each 
ideational structure in order to assess the causal 
effects ­ constitutive and transformative ­ of 
one on the other, and on agency. ‘Bracketing’ 
means to make a variable ‘stable’, this is, not 
exploring its construction at the same time 
as it is used as an explanatory variable. Cons­
tructivism needs to ‘stabilise’ ideational struc­
tures such as identity and institutions, not for 
claiming that such ideational structures really 
are stable – something broadly criticised by 
poststructuralist analyses (i.e. Zehfuss, 2002), 
but only for analytical purposes (Finnemo­
re, 1996; Checkel, 2001), in order to show 
what are the constitutive and causal effects of 
one on the other and the ways in which they 
constitute agents’ interests and cause action in 
concrete cases.
If one has the aim of ‘explaining’, ex­
planations must start somewhere, and more 
than taking ‘reality’ as something more or 
less a priori ‘given’, constructivism needs to 
‘bracket’ ideational structures in order to as­
sess their explanatory role. If we want to turn 
a factor into an explanatory variable it is ne­
cessary to bracket it or make it stable because 
treating a factor as both the explanans and the 
explanandum at the same time – accordingly, 
what explains and what is to be explained – is 
problematic. Consider the following example: 
let us assume that Söderbaum sees the shared 
interest of regime­boosting among sadc sta­
te leaders as a result of these states sharing a 
collective identity as ‘weak’ states that suffer a 
significant lack of legitimacy. My claim is that, 
in order to assess the explanatory role of such 
identity in actors’ interest in pursuing regio­
nalism, we cannot ask at the same time how 
or why such collective identity was constituted 
among sadc state leaders, nor can we explain 
why sadc states are weak and lack legitimacy. 
All questions have to do with the same thing, 
but we cannot answer them simultaneously.
The same happens with the constructi­
vist analyses of the role of institutions in the 
creation of a collective identity among eu and 
national bureaucrats. We cannot assess the so­
cialisation effects of eu institutions at the same 
time as we try to understand why and how 
eu institutions were created in the first place. 
These are two different questions that need to 
be answered in separate fashion, one at a time, 
and not necessarily in the same analysis. It is 
not necessary to enquire into the construction 
of a certain identity and certain institutions in 
order to assess their causal effects, both consti­
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tutive and transformative, on each other and 
on agency. This is not to say that the process of 
social construction of identity and institutions 
is irrelevant, but only to say that by bracketing 
and taking them as given we are not ruling out 
the possibility of assessing their explanatory 
role. In the case of Acharya’s work, the problem 
is not that he ‘brackets’ norms in order to show 
how they cause the emergence of a collective 
identity in the form of the ‘asean Way’, but, 
more crucially, that he discards the role of 
identity in the emergence and maintenance 
of such norms, even more when he provides 
evidence of the existence of possible sources of 
a pre­existing collective identity among asean 
member states.
As the previous sections of the paper 
showed, Söderbaum, Hettne and Van Lan­
genhove (and my previous work) implicitly 
tended to bracket identity to assess its effects 
on the pursuit of regionalism – which entails 
regional institution building, while Checkel, 
Risse and other constructivist authors bracke­
ted institutions – not always explicitly, to assess 
their effects on the formation of a collective 
identity in the eu. Acharya himself implicitly 
bracketed norms (the explanatory variable) 
when he said that his study “is intended to 
analyse systematically the role of asean’s norms 
in the management of regional order and their 
effects on the development of collective interests 
and identities” (Acharya, 2009, 9, emphasis 
mine). I argue that, in order to assess the role 
of identity and institutions in the unfolding 
of regionalism, it is necessary to bracket both 
ideational structures and agency, and in this 
way constructivism can provide ‘better’ expla­
nations in terms of meeting its aim to combine 
‘explaining’ (causal theorising understood in 
the Humean conception of causation) and 
‘understanding’ (constitutive theorising un­
derstood in the interpretive and hermeneutic 
sense of postmodernist and poststructuralist 
approaches).
Once we have bracketed one variable 
and then the other, we can put together our 
conclusions and provide an explanation of the 
terms in which collective identity and regio­
nal institutions constitute and transform each 
other and what effects they have on agency. 
Moreover, through bracketing and ideational 
variable for assessing its explanatory role, it is 
possible to make findings about the ways in 
which such variable – i.e. a collective identity, 
is constructed through agents’ interaction. For 
this, it is crucial to consider agents’ discourse 
on their views on identity and institutions. 
Broadening the concept of causation and 
distinguishing different types of causes enga­
ging the Aristotelian classification is also ne­
cessary in order to overcome constructivism’s 
confusion between constitutive and causal 
theorising, and this enables the provision of 
multi­causal explanations which are more en­
compassing and adequate for understanding 
the unfolding of social life and, in regard to 
the topic concerning this paper, of regionalism.
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